Federal Procedure—Motion to Secure Costs—Effect of New Federal Rules by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 3 
January 1939 
Federal Procedure—Motion to Secure Costs—Effect of New 
Federal Rules 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Federal Procedure—Motion to Secure Costs—Effect of New Federal Rules, 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 422 (1939). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss3/15 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
422 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
The effect of the instant holding in practice deserves consideration. If
the register is to be assured of getting copies, it must apparently be by
affirmative action on his part under Section 13. Lack of incentive to sub-
mit copies of works until required by the register or until suit is contem-
plated may be expected to result in inaction by many copyright owners.
The dilemma that results is either a serious increase in the register's burden
or a detrimental decrease in the notice value of the files. Moreover, a fiscal
problem is involved, for the small fees that must accompany deposits con-
tribute materially to meeting the expenses of the copyright office.
The decision seems open to serious question both upon orthodox princi-
ples of statutory construction and because of its probable practical conse-
quences. C. J. D.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-MOTION TO SECURE COSTS-EFFECT OF NEw FEDERAL
RuLES-[Federal].-In a case in the federal courts, defendant filed a mo-
tion for securing costs. Plaintiff resisted the motion on the ground that the
newly-adopted Rules make no provision for costs and hence such motion is
not available under the present procedure. Rule 12(h) provides: "A party
waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either by mo-
tion as hereinbeforel provided, or if he has made no motion, in his answer
or reply * * * ." Held, objection overruled on the ground that the long-
established practice of the district courts in respect to motion for costs can-
not be deemed to have been nullified by indirection in the manner suggested. 2
The power of the federal courts to require security for costs before the
adoption of the new Rules depended upon the existence of a provision there-
for by the state law or a rule of court; without such authority no such
power existed.3 The effect of the adoption of the new Rules on the Con-
formity Act,4 the Equity Rules,5 and the rules of court of each district in
force at the time of the adoption must be established before rulings as to
the problems involved in the instant case can become consistent under the
new procedure. There seems to be a division of opinion as to whether the
Conformity Act and the Equity Rules have been superseded.0 Little has
1. Rule 12(b) provisions for motions directed to (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) im-
proper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Wheeler v. Lientz Manufacturing Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1939) 25 F.
Supp. 939. Accord: Alderman v. Whelan Drug Co., Inc. (D. C. D. C. 1939)
6 U. S. L. Week 869, where third party defendant was held entitled to se-
curity for costs.
3. 5 Longsdorf, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (1929) 175, sec. 1558;
Sermons v. Kansas City Southern Ry. (1926) 11 F. (2d) 671, where it is
said: "In absence of a federal statute or a rule of court upon the subject,
the matter is governed by the state law. * * * it appearing therefore that
there is no rule of court or statute, either state or federal authorizing the
amounts of the motion in this case, the same should be denied."
4. (1872) 17 Stat. 197, (1928) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 724.
5. (1842) 4 Stat. 499, (1928) 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 723 et seq.
6. That the Conformity Act has been superseded entirely, see April, 1937,
Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure Appointed
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been written of the present status of the former rules of the district courts,
but it would seem that they are superseded only insofar as inconsistent
with the new Rules. 7 To hold that all such rules have been nullified would
be to force the district courts to readopt them under the power given in
Rule 83,8 which seems an unnecessary formality. Had the Supreme Court
desired to review rules already promulgated, it could have provided that
copies of the rules be forwarded to it. It is therefore arguable that the
Supreme Court did not intend to require the readoption of rules of the dis-
trict courts not inconsistent with the new Rules.
If the power of the District Court to grant the ruling in the instant case
rests upon an antecedent rule of court,9 there seems little doubt that the
holding is correct. If such power is dependent upon the state practice,10
the present status of the Conformity Act becomes important. If that Act
is still in force, insofar as it has not been superseded, some procedural rul-
ings are controlled by state practice "as near as may be." Other points not
covered by the new Rules, but formerly controlled by conformity, may well
by the Supreme Court of the United States 217; 1 Moore and Friedman,
Federal Practice (1938) 36; but see 3 Moore and Friedman, op. cit. supra,
3719, n. 12, referring to the final report of the Advisory Committee striking
proposed Rule 74 because government officials prefer to use state practice
under the Conformity Act in regard to condemnations. That the Conform-
ity Act is superseded only in so far as inconsistent with the new rules see
Babbit, The New Rules of Federal Procedure (1938) 26; Schweppe, Survey
of the New Federal Rules (1938) 13 Wash. L. Rev. 162, 164, n. 18. That
the Equity Rules are entirely superseded, see 1 Moore and Friedman, Fed-
eral Practice (1938) 36, Babbit, The New Rules of Federal Procedure
(1938) 26.
7. 1 Moore and Friedman, Federal Practice (1938) 37, "The Federal
Rules superseded all District Court rules which are inconsistent with the
Federal Rules. The first two sentences of Rule 83 permit each District
Court to supplement the Federal Rules with local rules facilitating the trans-
action of its business."
8. "Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may
from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not incon-
sistent with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any
district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme
Court of the United States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the dis-
trict courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
these rules."
9. Such a rule is found in the Rules of the District Courts of the United
States for the Eastern District of Missouri: "Rule XIX. Security for costs:
a. Security for costs, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be given
in every case by plaintiff or petitioner, by making a deposit of fifty dollars
in cash with the Clerk at the time of instituting the action or suit. * * *
c. The court, or judge thereof, may, upon proper showing, require any party
to make an additional deposit as security for costs." The rules of court for
the Western District of Missouri are not available.
10. See R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 1237, 1238: " * * * or if in any case the
court shall be satisfied that any plaintiff is unable to pay the cost of suit,
* * * the court shall, on motion of the defendant or any officer of the court,
rule the plaintiff, on or before the day in such rule named, to give security
for the payment of costs in such suit."
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arise, as the njw Rules do not purport to cover every detail of procedure.1
To follow state practice on such points would be to construct a new body
of rules based on state acts, distinct and separate from the Rules. A pri-
mary purpose of the Rules was to eliminate that very situation.12
Approximate uniformity may be anticipated from employment of former
rules of district courts, the new Rules and rules adopted by district courts
pursuant to Rule 83."- The first two sentences of that rule are clear. The
power delegated by the phrase "regulation of practice" in the third sen-
tence apparently means that each judge may regulate questions of proce-
dure not covered by any rule.' 4 Unless this is its meaning the sentence
would appear redundant; but oral rulings may, by usage and custom, be-
come rules. 15 The rule-making power in the federal system has generally
been embodied in statutes,16 but it has been declared to be inherent in the
courts.' 7
With the new Rules as a foundation, federal procedural law may be kept
in relative uniformity through publication by district courts of necessary
supplemental rules. Though the last sentence of Rule 83 apparently con-
templates appropriate rulings by district judges in the absence of specific
rules, this power should be exercised cautiously. Where it appears that
similar circumstances are likely to recur, an appropriate rule should be
formulated and published by a majority of the judges of the district. The
court in the instant case seems properly to have had these factors in mind
in stating that "it cannot be assumed that the rules long established by the
district court under former authority and continued under Rule 83, * * *
not inconsistent with statute or the spirit or objectives of the newly pre-
scribed general rules of procedure, are nullified in the indirect manner
suggested." F. H. B.
11. 1 Moore and Friedman, Federal Practice (1938) 38, 39; 3 Moore and
Friedman, op. cit. supra, 3443, 3444. Rule 83 upon its face anticipates de-
tails which have not been covered.
12. Hutcheson, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 Wash. L.
Rev. (1938) 198, 202: "The second fundamental change is the substitution
of the principle of uniformity for that of conformity-the substitution of a
single uniform system in all the Federal courts, alike in every state, in
law as well as equity actions, instead of the so-called Conformity Act of
1872."
13. Supra, note 8.
14. See 3 Moore and Friedman, Federal Practice (1938) 3443.
15. Duncan v. United States (U. S. 1833) 7 Pet. 435: "It is not neces-
sary that any court in changing its practice should do so by adoption of
written rules. Its practice may be established by a uniform mode of pro-
ceding, for a series of years, and this forms the law of the court." See
also Fullerton v. United States Bank (1828) 1 Pet. 604; 5 Longsdorf,
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (1929) 397.
16. Fullerton v. United States Bank (1828) 1 Pet. 604; Duncan v. United
States (1833) 7 Pet. 435.
17. Rose, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (5th ed. 1938) 47; Pound,
Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court (1915) 10 Ill. L. Rev.
163, 172: "Indeed the power to govern procedure by general rules has been
universally regarded as part of the judicial function and hence an inherent
power of the courts of justice."
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